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164 H. J. HEINZ Co. v. SuPERIOR CouRT [42 C.2d 
[S. F. No. 18605. In Bank. Jan. 29, 1954.] 
H. J. HEINZ COMPANY (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Patents-Actions-Infringement- Injunctive Relief.-Where 
complaint in patent owner's action to enjoin defendant from 
making and using patented vinegar generators alleged that 
defendant threatened to exercise rights under an invalid license 
and threatened to build generators of character covered by 
patent, and court in its judgment declared that defendant had 
no right to build generators covered by patent and that de-
fendant was Testrainecl from asserting or claiming "the right 
or license" to build or operate vinegar generators of type 
covered by patent other than one vinegar generator installed 
by plaintiff at defendant's factory, effect of judgment was that 
defendant was enjoined not only from exercising any rights 
under license but also any right to build generators covered by 
patent independent of license. 
[2] Id.-Actions-Jurisdiction.-A state court has jurisdiction in 
equity action to cancel and set aside license agreement to use 
a patent where there is also involved, and judgment includes, 
an injunction against threatened infringement of patent, since 
the federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1338 (a)), that federal 
district court has exclusive jurisdiction of "action [s]" arising 
under federal patent law, does not purport to cover all patent 
right "question [ s J" which may arise in some other kind of 
"action" or "case" such as one based on common law or equity; 
hence the latter actions are within jurisdiction of state courts. 
[3] Id.-Actions-Jurisdiction.-Where patentee complainant asks 
aid of court in declaring forfeiture of a license or in restoring 
unclouded title to patent, he does not give federal district court 
jurisdiction of cause as one arising under patent laws; nor 
may he confer such jurisdiction by adding to his bill an aver-
ment that after forfeiture shall be declared or title to patent 
shall be restored, he fears that defendant will infringe and 
therefore asks an injunction to prevent it. 
[2] Jurisdiction of state court over actions involving patents, 
note, 167 A.L.R. 1114. See, also, Cal.Jur., Patents, § 7; Am.Jur., 
Patents, §§ 169, 170. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Patents, § 9; [2, 3] Patents, § 8; 
[ 4-6, 8, 9] Contempt, § 63; [7] Contempt, § 3; [10, 11] Injunctions, 
§ 101; [12] Injunctions, § 102. 
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[7] Id.-Nature and Purpose of Court's Power.-Enforcement of 
an order of contempt is not for vindication of a private right 
but is for maintenance of dignity and authority of court, and 
to preserve peace and dignity of people of the state. 
[8] Id..-Prmishment-A.dequacy of Statutory Provisions.-Insofar 
as contempt is against authority of court, Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1218, limiting extent of punishment for contempt, is adequate 
to compel enforcement of its order since each day's violation 
is a separate offense. 
[9] Id.-Punishment-Damages.-To allow compensatory damages 
in a contempt proceeding would have effect of turning it into 
an action for damages, and in such action the parties are 
ordinarily entitled to a trial by jury and an appeal, neither 
of which may be accorded petitioner in a contempt proceeding. 
[10] Injunctions-Violation-Affidavit.-Affidavit initiating a con-
tempt proceeding for violation of injunction decreeing that 
defendant had no right or license to build or use vinegar 
generators of type covel'ed by plaintiff's patent was sufficient 
to confer jurisdiction on trial court where, in addition to 
stating some things to effect that affiant was so informed and 
believed, it squarely stated that defendant's conduct was a 
violation of injunction, and where sufficient facts were set 
forth, namely, that defendant had built and used generators 
covered by plaintiff's patent contrary to terms of injunction. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1211.) 
[11] Id.-Violation--Affidavit.-Facts peculiarly within knowledge 
of one charged with violating an injunction may be on in-
formation and belief. 
[ 5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 42; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 61 
et seq. 
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[12] !d.-Violation- Hearing and Determination.-In contempt 
proceeding for violation of injunction decreeing that defendant 
had no right or license to build or use vinegar generators of 
type covered by plaintiff's patent, court's order directing de-
struction of generators is supportable as a method of pre-
venting defendant from further violating injunction. 
PROCEEDING in certiorari to review an order of the 
Superior Court of Alameda County adjudging licensee guilty 
of contempt of court, awarding compensatory damages to 
patent owner, and ordering destruction of patented vinegar 
generators. Portion of order awarding compensatory dam-
ages, annulled; portion of order directing destruction of 
generators, affirmed. 
Chickering & Gregory, William H. Parmelee, Frederick 
M. Fisk, Paul M. Duff, Moses Lasky, Christy, Parmelee & 
Strickland, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison and Herman Phleger 
for Petitioner. 
Morris Lowenthal, Juliet Lowenthal and Karl D. Lyon for 
Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-This is a review of an order made after 
proceedings in contempt for violation of an injunction issued 
in an action in which Charles Owens was plaintiff, hereafter 
referred to as plaintiff, and H. J. Heinz Company, a corpora-
tion, petitioner here, was defendant, hereafter referred to as 
defendant. 
In 1943, plaintiff commenced the above-mentioned action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant, charging 
that he was the owner of a patent for a vinegar generator; that 
a license agreement from plaintiff to defendant to use the 
patent in making and using the generator was obtained by 
fraud and lacked consideration. A declaration of the inva-
lidity and unenforceability of the license was asked, together 
with a declaration that defendant had no right to build or 
use the patented generators, but threatened to do so, and 
should be restrained from asserting any claims under the 
license. On December 21, 1944, the court gave judgment in 
that action declaring the license invalid and unenforceable; 
that plaintiff owned the patent and defendant had no right 
to build or use generators of the character covered by plain-
tiff's patent. Defendant was enjoined from asserting any 
right under the license or any right to build or use the gen-
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erator covered by the patent other than one at its plant in 
Berkeley, California. That judgment became and is final. 
In September, 1949, plaintiff filed in that action an affi-
davit stating that the court had issued an injunction wherein 
it was adjudged and decreed that defendant had no right or 
license to build or use vinegar generators of the type covered 
by plaintiff's patent and that the purported license given by 
plaintiff to defendant was invalid; that the judgment provided 
(stating the exact words of the injunction) that notwithstand-
ing the injunction plaintiff is "informed" that defendant has 
built and used the generators covered by plaintiff's patent; 
that in correspondence with defendant in June of 1949, the 
latter did not deny that it had built and installed generators 
but did deny that it violated plaintiff's rights; that when 
plaintiff was installing a generator at defendant's Berkeley 
plant the latter's agent took pictures and sketches thereof, 
and during the installation, one of plaintiff's assembly prints 
disappeared and plaintiff believes the agent took it; that plain-
tiff believes defendant has appropriated his patent and is 
claiming the right to make and use generators covered thereby; 
that defendant's conduct is in violation of the injunction. 
Pursuant to the affidavit the court issued an order reciting 
that it appeared that defendant had been making and using 
generators in violation of the injunction and directing defend-
ant to show cause why an order should not be made holding 
it in contempt of court for violating the injunction and why 
there should not be made such other orders as may be required 
to "correet" the violations. Defendant filed a return to the 
order to show cause (later amended) asserting insufficiency 
of plaintiff's affidavit, the lack of jurisdiction of the court 
in granting· the injunction because it involved patent rights 
over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, and 
denying that it had built or used generators of the type cov-
ered by the patent. Defendant moved to vacate the order to 
show cause and to modify the injunction by striking out the 
provisions thereof restraining it from building and using gen-
erators of the type covered by the patent, asserting that they 
invaded the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
The court made an "interlocutory order" reciting the fore-
going and that it had denied defendant's motions; that the 
judgment in the action was res judicata of defendant's claims 
of lack of jurisdiction; that defendant was estopped to assert 
lack of jurisdiction; and that the sole issue was whether the 
injunction had been violated. The court made findings on 
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the right, if any, of defendant to build and use the generators 
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Defendant's n:min contentions are: That the court had no 
jurisdiction to grant the injunction in the action nor enter-
tain the because they involved patent 
rights within the exclusive jurisdiction of tl1e federal courts 
and hence it could not be held in contempt for violat-
ing the ; tbat the court had no authority to award 
to plaintiff, in the proceedings, compensatory dam-
from the Yiolation of the injunction. 
of jurisdiction to grant the injunetion in 
the action and entertain the proceedings, it should 
be noted that the Constitution of the United States provides 
that shall have pOIYer ''To promote the progress of 
science ann useful for limited times to ... 
to their ... discov-
eries." CU. S. Const., art. I, § 8 ( 8), and pursuant thereto 
Congrefls has provided by statute that : ''The [federal] district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action aris-
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ing under any Act of Congress relating to patents, copyrights 
and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the 
courts of the states in patent and copyright cases." (28 
U.S.C.A., § 1338 (a).) Before coming to the question of the jur-
isdiction of the court to grant injunctive relief in the judgment 
rendered in the action, other things must be considered. 
[1] Defendant claims that the action, and ensuing judg-
ment granting plaintiff injunctive relief against defendant, 
dealt only with conduct by it in claiming and exercising a 
right under the license agreement to build and use the gener-
ators; that the court did not enjoin it from infringing plain-
tiff's patent independent of the license, but in the contempt 
proceeding the court construed the injunctive provisions in 
the judgment as prohibiting infringement as well as claiming 
rights under the license, and that so interpreted, the court 
lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment with its injunctive 
provisions because of the exclusive federal court jurisdiction. 
It is true that the complaint in the action charges that defend-
ant threatens to exercise rights under the license, which plain-
tiff asserts is invalid, by building generators of the character 
covered by the patent, but it is also alleged that defendant 
threatens to build generators of the character covered by 
plaintiff's patent and, by so doing, is causing depreciation of 
the value of plaintiff's patent. In the prayer it is asked that 
it be declared that defendant has no right to build generators 
of the type covered by plaintiff's patent and that it be enjoined 
from claiming any rights under the patent and claiming any 
right to build generators covered by plaintiff's patent. Fairly 
interpreted, the complaint demands that the license be set aside 
and, prevailing on that issue, relief be granted for infringe-
ment. Defendant, in its answer, denied it had no right to 
build generators covered by the patent. In its findings the 
court stated that plaintiff was the owner of the patent; that 
the license was void; that a controversy existed between the 
parties concerning defendant's right to build generators cov-
ered by the patent and concerning the effect of the license; 
that defendant threatens to exercise and claim rights under 
the license and to build generators covered by the patent, which 
will cause depreciation in the value of the patent. In its judg-
ment the court declared defendant has no right to build gen-
erators covered by the patent and that defendant is restrained 
"from asserting or claiming the right or license to build or 
have built for itself or to maintain or operate vinegar gener-
ators of the type, kind or character covered by any Letters 
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Patent [issued to] ... plaintiff ... , other than the one vinegar 
generator installed by plaintiffs at the [defendant's] . . . 
factory in Berkeley, California." (Emphasis added.) Thus 
it is clear enough that defendant was enjoined not only from 
exercising any rights under the license but also any right to 
build generators covered by the patent independent of the li-
cense. Moreover, it was determined by the trial court (the same 
judge who tried the action) in the contempt proceedings that 
the injunction embraced infringement of the patent. It found 
in its "interlocutory order" in the contempt proceedings 
heretofore mentioned: ''The allegations and prayer in the 
complaint [in the action] for declaratory relief and the evi-
dence produced at the trial were not confined to the existence 
of the alleged license but went beyond said 'license' on plain-
tiff's contention that the defendant H. J. Heinz Company 
claimed the right and had been threatening to make gener-
ators of the kind covered by Owens' patents, independently of 
the alleged 'license.' It clearly appears that this action as 
filed and prosecuted by plaintiffs was not confined solely to 
the validity of said 'license' but was equally concerned with 
the threats made by the defendants, both under the license 
and independent of the license, to build and operate vinegar 
generators of the kind and character covered by the said letters 
patent owned by Charles H. Owens, everywhere in the world 
and without paying any consideration therefor. It also ap-
pears that one of the issues raised by the plaintiffs' complaint, 
as well as by defendants' answer thereto, was whether or not 
this Court would decree and declare that the H. J. Heinz 
Company had no right of future infringement of the Owens 
patents and had no right in the future to erect generators, 
whether under the alleged license or otherwise, of the kind 
covered by said plaintiff's patents .... 
''The said answer filed by defendants did raise a question 
requiring an original interpretation by the Court of the scope 
and claims of the Letters Patent No. 2,089,412, owned by plain-
tiff Charles H. Owens, by contending and asserting that the 
said generator installed at the Berkeley plant was not identical 
with and similar to, in every respect, the Owens installation at 
the plant of the Frank Tea & Spice Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, and 
susceptible of operation in the same manner as the Frank 
installation was operated .... In said answer defendant H. J. 
Heinz Company asserted the right to build and erect generators 
of the type covered by the aforesaid patent of plaintiff not only 
upon the basis of the alleged 'license' of November 25, 1941, 
Jan.1954] H. J. HEINZ Co. v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
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but also upon the basis of an alleged oral agreement claimed 
to have been made with plaintiffs prior to August 28, 1940 .... 
The answer further affirmed that the H. J. Heinz Company 
claimed the right to build and have built for itself and to 
operate vinegar generators of the type, kind and character 
covered by the letters patent owned by Charles H. Owens and 
the answer admitted that a justiciable controversy existed be-
tween Owens and said defendant company on that subject .... 
''As appears from said judgment and decree and as intended 
by this Court, based upon and pursuant to the issues raised 
by plaintiffs' complaint and by defendants' answer and by 
the evidence, the said decree and injunction of this Court was 
not confined to the limited question of the existence or validity 
of the alleged 'license' agreement and any rights of defendant 
thereunder, but perpetually prohibited the defendant H. J. 
Heinz Company from either asserting the right to build or 
from building or erecting or operating such Owens Giant Type 
Generators, irrespective of whether the defendant company 
asserted a license from Owens to do so.'' On several occasions 
during various proceedings in the trial court defendant in 
effect conceded that the infringement issue was adjudicated. 
The United States Court of Appeals passed upon that ques-
tion of interpretation. After the contempt proceedings were 
initiated defendant sought declaratory relief in federal district 
court to enjoin plaintiff from prosecuting those proceedings 
in the superior court on the ground that the state court had 
no jurisdiction. Judgment was rendered in the federal dis-
trict court against defendant and it appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the judgment 
(II. J. Heinz Co. v. Owens, 189 F.2d 505, cert. den. 342 
U.S. 905 [72 S.Ct. 294, 96 L.Ed. 677]), reciting the facts as 
to the injunctive provisions of the judgment as above men-
tioned and stating that the injunction restrained an infringe-
ment on the patent. Defendant had claimed lack of jurisdic-
tion in the state court. The United States Court of Appeals 
held that the federal courts had no authority, by reason of 
a federal statute, to enjoin a state court. Defendant moved 
for a correction of the opinion, asserting that the injunctive 
provisions of the judgment should not have been interpreted 
as restraining infringement of the patent. In denying the 
motion the court of appeals stated, defendant asserts "that 
this court has misconceived the factual basis and legal holding 
(Jf a state court adjudication [the injunction judgment] with 
reference to the matter in controversy. In one particular, 
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appellant [defendant here] is correct. Owens did not claim 
and the state court did not find that Heinz had actually 
infringed the Owens patent. Rather Owens claimed and the 
court found only a threatened infr·ingement. However, noth-
ing in our decision turns upon any difference between actual 
infringement and threatened infringement as a basis of adjudi-
cation in the state court. 'l'he important thing is the scope 
of the decree of the state court with reference to future in-
fringement. On that point, despite appellant's renewed urg-
ing to the contrary, we understand the action of the state 
court to have been as heretofore stated in our opinion in this 
case." (Emphasis added; H. J. He1:nz Co. v. Owens, 191 F.2d 
257.) To the same effect is an order made by the federal 
district court denying a petition by defendant, after the con-
tempt proceedings were instituted, to remove the contempt 
proceedings to the federal court on the ground that the latter 
and not the state court, had jurisdiction. On motion of plain-
tiff the proceedings were remanded to the state court. 
We conclude, therefore, that the injunction action and 
judgment did involve threatened infringement of the patent 
as well as rights under the license and respondent court was 
correct in so determining in the contempt proceedings. 
The question is, therefore, whether a state court has juris-
diction in an equity action to cancel and set aside a license 
agreement to use a patent, where there is also involved, and 
the judgment includes, an injunction against threatened in-
fringement of the patent in view of the provisions of article 
I, section 8(8) of the Constitution of the United States and 
federal statute, 28 U.S.C.A., section 1338(a), supra. In other 
words, we have a case in which plaintiff, as the owner of a 
patent, sought to have declared invalid, for fraud and lack 
of consideration, a license given by him to defendant, and 
if he was successful in that endeavor, he wanted future pro-
tection by injunction against the use of the patent by defend-
ant, that is, infringement. We have concluded that the state 
court had jurisdiction. 
[2] It will be noted that the statute (28 U.S. C. A., 
§ 1338 (a), snpra) states that the federal district court has 
exclusive jurisdiction of "action [ s] " arising under federal 
patent law. It does not purport to cover all patent right 
"question[s]" which may arise in some other kind of an 
''action'' or ''case'' such as one based upon common law or 
equity; the latter actions manifestly are within the jurisdiction 
of the state courts. As said : ''Section 711 [the predecessor 
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of 28 U.S.C.A., § 1338(a), supra] does not deprive the state 
courts of the power to determine questions arising under the 
patent laws, but only of assuming jurisdiction of 'cases' arising 
under the patent laws." (Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co., 
168 U.S. 255, 259 [18 S.Ct. 62, 42 L.Ed. 458] .) [3] According-
ly, it is said that '' ... where a patentee complainant makes his 
suit one for recovery of royalties under a contract of license or 
assignment, or for damages for a breach of its covenants, or 
for a specific performance thereof, or asks the aid of the Court 
in declaring a forfeitur·e of the license or in restoring an un-
clouded title to the patent, he does not give the federal district 
court jurisdiction of the cause as one arising under the patent 
laws. Nor may he confer it in such a case by adding to his 
bill an averment that after the forfeiture shall be declared, 
or the title to the patent shall be restored, he fears the defend-
ant will infringe and therefore asks an injunction to prevent it. 
That was Wilson v. Sandford. If in that case the patentee 
complainant had based his action on his patent right and had 
sued for infringement, and by anticipation of a defense of the 
assignment had alleged a forfeiture by his own declaration 
without seeking aid of the court, jurisdiction [of the federal 
district court] under the patent laws would have attached, 
and he would have had to meet the claim by the defendant 
that forfeiture of the license or assignment and restoration 
of title could not be had except by a decree of a court, which 
if sustained, would have defeated his prayer for an injunction 
on the merits. But when the patentee exercises his choice and 
bases his action on the contract and seeks remedies thereunder, 
he may not give the case a double aspect, so to speak, and 
make it a patent case conditioned on his securing equitable 
relief as to the contract.'' (Emphasis added; Luckett v. Del-
park, 270 U.S. 496, 510 [ 46 S.Ct. 397, 70 L.Ed. 703] .) (See, 
also, Pendleton v. Ferguson, 15 Cal.2d 319 [101 P.2d 81, 688]; 
Seagren v. Smith, 63 Cal.App.2d 733 [147 P.2d 682] ; Deakins 
v. Superior Court, 90 Cal.App. 630 [266 P. 563] ; Wilson v. 
Sandford, 10 How.(U.S.) 99 [13 L.Ed. 344]; National Clay 
Products Co. v. If eath Unit Tile Co., 40 F.2d 617; 40 Am.Jur., 
Patents, § 170.) There is no basis for any distinction based on 
the claim that plaintiff may have repudiated the license before 
suit. The action still was one to cancel or revoke the written 
license as it was still outstanding in defendant's hands and 
for the further relief against threatened patent infringement. 
[4] On the question of the propriety of awarding com-
pensatory damages, that is, damages suffered by plaintiff by 
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reason of defendant's violation of the injunction, petitioner 
eontends that the court had no authority in a contempt action 
to award such damages. This contention must be sustained. 
[5] In this state "the power of the Courts to. ptmish for 
contempt has been regulated by statute ... " since 1851 
(Gallancl v. Galland, 44 Cal. 475, 478 [13 Am.Rep. '167]; Ex 
parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 175, 176, 177). Section 1218 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure provides that '' ... a fine may be imposed 
on him [one guilty of contempt] not exceeding five hundred 
dollars, or he may be imprisoned not exceeding five days, or 
both .... '' Section 1219 authorizes imprisonment as a co-
ercive measure where the contempt consists of a refusal to 
perform an ordered act. These provisions have been the law 
since their enactment in 1851 and have been recognized by 
the courts as establishing the limits within which a court may 
punish for contempt. (Ex parte Cohen, 6 Cal. 318, 319, 321.) 
In In re Garner·, 179 Cal. 409 [177 P. 162], it was held that 
section 1218 was constitutional and that the imposition of a 
penalty in excess of that prescribed by that section was an 
act beyond the power of the court and therefore void. 
So far as the alleged "inherent" power of the court to 
award compensatory damages is concerned, section 4 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure provides that the rule of the common 
law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly con-
strued has no application ''to this code.'' Several cases have 
set forth the rule that section 1218 is a ''limitation upon the 
power formerly exercised by the court to punish for contempt'' 
(Galland v. Galland, supra, 44 Cal. 475, 478; In re Garner, 
supm, 179 Cal. 409; Ex parte Abbott, 94 Cal. 333 [29 P. 622]; 
Matter of Tyler, 64 Cal. 434). We are referred to no authority 
in support of the order of the trial court either in this state, or 
elsewhere, where contempt proceedings are regulated by statu-
tory provisions similar to ours, and independent research dis-
closes none. On the other hand, Idaho and Montana, whose 
Codes of Civil Procedure were taken from that of California, 
have both held that their statutory provisions precluded the 
courts from imposing compensatory damages for contempt. 
(State ex rel. Flynn v. District Court, 24 Mont. 33 [60 P. 493] ; 
Levan v. Richards, 4 Idaho 667 [43 P. 574].) Both decisions 
note that their contempt statutes are the same as in California 
and rely upon the California cases heretofore cited. 
[6] The injured person's property rights may be ade-
quately protected through recourse to the remedies provided 
by other statutory law. In In re Morris, 194 Cal. 63, 69 [227 
Jan. 1954] H. J. HEINZ Co. v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
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P. 914], it was held that acts in contempt of court had a triple 
aspect, and that "It [was] apparent upon reflection that the 
same act may at the same time take on a third aspect in which 
it is to be regarded as an offense against private rights, and 
remediable as such by an ordinary action at law." (See, too, 
Kirby v. San Francisco Sav. & Loan Soc., 95 Cal.App. 757 
[273 P. 609].) In 39 California Law Review, at page 560, the 
author states that ''California has no provision for compensa-
tory contempt proceedings. Civil damages may be collected 
in an ordinary civil action for an act otherwise a contempt.'' 
[7] The enforcement of an order of contempt in this state 
is not for the vindication of a private right but is for the 
maintenance of the dignity and authority of the court, and to 
preserve the peace and dignity of the people of the State of 
California (In re Morris, s~tpra, 194 Cal. 63, 69). [8] Inso-
far as the contempt is against the authority of the court, sec-
tion 1218 of the Code of Civil Procedure is adequate to compel 
the enforcement of its order since each day's violation is a 
separate offense. 
[9] To allow compensatory damages in the contempt pro-
ceeding would have the effect of turning it into an action for 
damages. In an action for damages, tl1e parties are ordinarily 
entitled to a trial by jury and an appeal, neither of which 
has been accorded the petitioner in this proceeding. 
Defendant claims that the affidavit initiating the contempt 
proceeding was insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial 
court. We have heretofore set forth its contents. The code 
requires that where the contempt is outside the court's pres-
ence, the affidavit should set forth the facts constituting the 
contempt. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1211.) [10] While the affidavit 
does state some things in language to the effect that affiant is so 
informed and believes, it is squarely stated in the last sentence 
that the conduct of defendant was a violation of the injunction. 
Sufficient facts were set forth, namely, that defendant had built 
and used generators covered by plaintiff's patent contrary to 
the terms of the injunction. [11] Facts peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the one charged with violating the injunction may 
be on information and belief. (Ballentine v. Superior Court, 26 
Cal.2d 254 [158 P.2d 14] .) Certainly it was peculiarly within 
defendant's knowledge as to what extent it was building and 
using generators covered by plaintiff's patent. 
Defendant makes other contentions such as that it was denied 
due process of law because the court would not pass upon the 
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validity of plaintiff's patent in the contempt proceedings. The 
trial court found that issue was not relevant in those proceed-
ings and that defendant had the opportunity to raise that issue 
in the action in which the injunction was obtained, and not 
having done so, it was res judicata. 
[12] Ordering the destruction of the generators would 
seem supportable as a method of preventing defendant from 
further violating the injunction. It would seem that if a 
person may be deprived of his liberty until he complies with 
a valid judgment or order of a court, he may be required to 
destroy that which he created in violation of such judgment 
or order. In Morton v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 496 [4 P. 489], 
a dam was ordered removed by court order and it was also 
ordered that the corporation, its officers, agents and employees 
and all persons acting under it be enjoined and restrained from 
continuing or maintaining the same. After its removal, pur-
suant to court order, one whom the court found to be an agent 
of the corporation reconstructed the dam. The agent who 
reconstructed the dam was ordered imprisoned until the dam 
was again removed from the property. It has been recently 
held that a court may order the destruction of a building 
constructed in violation of a provision in the grant of a right 
of way for a power line by a predecessor in interest of the 
owner of the servient tenement of which the latter had 
no knowledge. (Pacific Gas&; Elec. Co. v. Minnette, 115 Cal. 
App.2d 698 [252 P.2d 642] .) It would seem to follow that 
if such harsh consequences could flow from the unintentional 
violation of a provision in a deed, similar consequences 
flowing from the intentional violation of a court decree cannot 
be successfully challenged. 
That portion of the order awarding compensatory damages 
to the plaintiff is annulled; that portion of the order directing 
the destruction of 16 specified vinegar generators is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Concurring.-Although the "Final Order" 
in the contempt proceedings recites in Paragraph IX that the 
''object and purpose of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff 
and granted by this order are remedial and for the benefit 
of the plaintiff and not for the purpose or by way of punish-
ment of defendant for its wilful and knowing disobedience and 
violation of the . . . decree and injunction . . ., '' neverthe-
less, in Paragraphs V and VI of its order wherein the court 
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specifically directs that the generators in question be destroyed 
and prohibits further construction, maintenance and use of 
certain other g·enerators then in the course of construction, the 
court expressly declares and reiterates that those particular 
portions of the order (set forth in Paragraphs V and VI) 
were made ''To correct and prevent further and future viola-
tions of the injunction and decree .... " It is thus apparent 
that the provisions of Paragraph IX have particular reference 
to the compensatory monetary relief awarded Mr. Owens and 
do not preclude sustaining the directions contained in Para-
graphs V and VI on other grounds. 
The same thought was expressed by the court in its written 
memorandum opinion which preceded by three days the ''Final 
Order,'' and in which after determining the damages to be 
awarded to plaintiff the court continues: ''The second impor-
tant issue before the Court for determination is the nature 
of the corrective remedial relief to be granted. . . . The award 
of damages ... will fairly and duly compensate plaintiff for 
the wrongful use and operation by defendant of his patented 
generators and for the unjust enrichment of the defendant .... 
Such an award, however, would not and should not allow 
defendant to secure the very benefits of the fraudulent 'license' 
which this Court cancelled in 1944 by the decree and injunc-
tion. The continuing use by the defendant of the Owens type 
generators is without authorization of this Court or of plain-
tiff and is a continuing violation of the decree and injunction. 
Under such circumstances there is an inherent power of a 
Court of equity, in a civil contempt proceeding such as this, 
to grant the necessary corrective remedial relief to compel 
compliance with the injunction and decree. This can be 
accomplished only by the destruction and demolition of the 
generators that have been constructed in violation of the 
decree and by stopping all new construction. . . . " (Italics 
added.) 
In the memorandum opinion the court also commented that 
''At the outset, it must be noted that the controversy is not 
simply one involving patent infringement, but concerns thr 
violation and disobedience of a final court injunction . ... '' 
(Italics added.) 
And in the court's Interlocutory Order, which is expressly 
made a part of the Final Order in the contempt proceedings, 
it is noted that ''This proceeding is one to enforce the injunc-
tion and decree issued in the original trial of this action .... '' 
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Since in a sense it is true that any contempt proceeding 
seeking to enforce the terms of an injunction theretofore issued 
in favor of a private plaintiff is for plaintiff's benefit, it ap-
pears to me that the court's express recognition of that fact 
should not deprive it of the power which it was here exercising, 
of compelling compliance with the injunction, and to that end 
ordering destruction of generators which defendant had con-
structed and was using in direct, deliberate and flagrant dis-
regard of the injunction. The court repeatedly declared that 
the purpose of ordering the destruction was to enforce the 
earlier injunction. I believe it had power to do so and this 
view is supported by Morton v. Superior Coud (1884), 65 
Cal.496 [4P.489]. 
For the reasons above stated I concur in the judgment and, 
generally, in the reasoning of Mr. Justice Carter. 
SHENK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the 
decision of the cour~ insofar as it holds that the trial court had 
jurisdiction to grant the injunction and to entertain the con-
tempt proceedings. I am also in agreement with the holding 
that the power of the court to punish for contempt is legally 
limited by the provisions of section 1218 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure to a fine of ''not exceeding five hundred dollars,'' 
or to imprisonment "not exceeding five days," or both such 
fine and imprisonment. Therefore when the trial court as-
sumed to fine the defendant $375,934.66 for offenses based on 
daily violations in the past and $526 per day for continuing 
daily violations, and then proceeded to direct these sums to 
be paid as compensatory damages in favor of the plaintiff, an 
excess of exercisable power is obvious. 
Likewise the order based on the present record for the de-
struction of the generators valued at $160,000 was beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court and should be annulled. Paragraph 
IX of the order under review provides that "the object and 
purpose of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff and granted 
by this order are remedial and for the benefit of the plaintiff 
and not for the purpose or by way of punishment of defendant 
for its wilful and knowing disobedience and violation of" the 
injunction. There was nothing in the injunctive order requir-
ing the destruction of the generators. If the decree had 
ordered them destroyed a situation would have been presented 
similar to that involved in Morton v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 
496 [ 4 P. 489], relied on by the majority. In that case there 
was a mandatory injunction ordering the dam removed. It 
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was removed but was replaced by an agent of the party en-
joined. There could be no question of the power of the court 
to punish the agent for contempt and order the reconstructed 
dam removed. That is not this case. Here there is no order 
for destruction in the judgment of injunction and the declared 
purpose of the order of contempt is for the benefit of the plain-
tiff. In Ex Parte Gould (1893), 99 Cal. 360 [33 P. 1112, 37 
Am.St.Rep. 57, 21 L.R.A. 751], this court said, at page 362, 
quoting with approval from William's Case, 26 Pa.St. 19 [67 
Am.Dec. 374], that the purpose of a contempt proceeding "is 
not to indemnify the plaintiff for any damage he may have 
sustained by reason of such misconduct, but to vindicate the 
dignity and authority of the court. It is a special proceeding, 
criminal in character, in which the state is the real plaintiff 
or prosecutor." In recognition of this rule the majority opin-
ion here correctly states: ''The enforcement of an order of 
contempt in this state is not for the vindication of a private 
right but is for the maintenance of the dignity and authority 
of the court .... '' Nowithstanding that uniformly supported 
principle an order in this contempt proceeding for the destruc-
tion of property for the benefit of the plaintiff is affirmed. 
Such an order is not necessary to vindicate the power of the 
court. This could be accomplished by proceedings against the 
defendant for contempt under the authority and within the 
limitations of section 1218 of the Code of Civil Procedure for 
daily violations of the order of injunction. I would annul 
the order in its entirety. 
Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied Feb-
ruary 24, 1954. Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., were 
of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
